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1. Introduction 
Since Becker’s (1968) seminal work on the unemployment-crime relationship numerous contribu-
tions on that theme have been published. It has become increasingly clear that unemployment and 
crime relate to each other. In recent years a series of studies has investigated the link between 
unemployment and labour market institutions.
1 Some of theses institutions could have an indirect 
effect on crime via the unemployment rate as well as a direct effect. Examples are benefit dura-
tion, benefit replacement rate, and active labour market policy. The change in global trade and 
production technology has an extensive influence on the long-run perspective of less skilled peo-
ple on the labour market. Furthermore, it is well known that the criminal activity is higher for the 
less skilled (Freeman (1995)). Hence, the increase of the average skill level of an economy is an 
important duty of the long-run labour market policy. In the broader sense we can combine these 
variables as indicators of labour market policy. It has often been argued that an increase in benefit 
duration and benefit replacement rate increase unemployment. For active labour market policy the 
results are ambiguous, however, some more recent studies find unemployment reducing effects in 
the long run.
2  Even if this is true they could reduce criminal offences via the direct effect. It is 
therefore important to analyse this link, which has not been studied so far.  
The aim of this paper is to analyse the direct effects of labour market institutions and the average 
skill level on crime for fifteen European countries. There are two reasons why an extensive labour 
market policy could reduce crime. Firstly, if labour market policy reduces unemployment, it re-
duces crime via the unemployment-crime relationship. Secondly, active labour market policy 
could prevent individuals from criminal offences. Thirdly, a higher replacement rate and longer 
benefit durations respectively could reduce crime. In this case the unemployed benefit is a substi-
tute for illegal income from crime. Fourthly, if we understand labour market policy in the broader 
sense and consider schooling as a long term labour market policy, an increase of the skill level in 
the economy could reduce the liability to criminal activities. Additionally to different proxy vari-
ables for labour market policy thought has been given to other variables that have an impact on 
crime, like income, share of foreigners, share of long term unemployed, the employment popula-
tion ratio and the unemployment rate. Demographic aspects are also taken into account. 
The main results are the following: Firstly, the results change markedly if we control for unob-
served heterogeneity. In the context of criminal offences the estimates seem to be reliable only, if 
we apply fixed effects instead of simple pool specifications. Secondly, the effects of labour mar-
ket policy vary considerably with respect to the different types of criminal offences and cannot be 
subdivided into unambiguous effects on property crimes and violent crimes, respectively. Thirdly, 
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 See, for example, Belot and van Ours (2000), Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) and Nickell et al. (2002, 2005).  
2
 See, for example, Lechner et al. (2005).    2
the proxy variables for labour market policy we consider have different importance with respect to 
their effect on criminal offences. Benefit replacement rate has in most of the cases a negative ef-
fect on the different criminal offences. The effect of benefit duration is mixed. In some cases it 
increases (e.g. robbery and drug offences) and in other cases it decreases (e.g. intentional homi-
cide and theft) criminal activity. The combination of a shorter benefit duration and higher re-
placement rate, like in the Nordic countries, seems to be a “crime reducing” combination. Active 
labour market policy has no significant effects over-all, but in some cases it seems to reduce the 
addiction to crime. Finally, average years of schooling have a negative effect on intentional homi-
cide and theft, but a positive effect on robbery and drug offences.  
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we use a simple theoretical model to motivate the 
econometric approach. Section 3 describes the data and section 4 the econometric models. Section 
5 reports the estimation results and section 6 concludes. 
2. Theoretical Framework 
In this section we provide some theoretical consideration to motivate the econometric model in 
section 4. As Grogger (1998) points out, most of the persons who spend time for committing 
crime also work on the labour market. Therefore, each individual not only choose between income 
( ) I  and leisure () L  but also between hours for committing crime ( ) C H  and hours for legal work 
() M H . The utility function ( ) U  increases with decreasing rates in both income and leisure, as 
usual:
3 
  () max , UIL
 (1) 
Income consists of labour income () M wH , returns to crime  ( ) ( ) C rH , and non-labour income ( ) G . 
The returns to crime are concave, that is, the more crimes the individual commits, the less remu-
nerative is each additional crime.
4  
  () MC I wH r H G =+ +  (2) 
Leisure is defined as time available () T  minus hours spend for legal work and committing crime: 
  M C LTH H =− −  (3) 
                                                   
3
 The following model is based on the work of Gronau (1977) and Grogger (1998). Because a formal discussion of the model is already made 
by these sources, we do not repeat this here.  
4
 Recall that if the returns to crime were linear, the optimally conditions imply a corner solution. See, for example, Ehrlich (1973) for a 
formal discussion.    3
The individual will choose to commit crime (and reduce working time and/or leisure), if crime 
pays higher wages. The gap between  ( ) C rH  and  M wH  increases with the probability () p  of being 
apprehended. In this case the individual has to be in for a punishment ( ) S .  
  () ( ) 1 CM prH p S w H −− >  (4) 
Equation (4) shows that the chance of being caught affects the decision to commit crime. More-
over, crime will be reduced if the punishment increases and/or the opportunities of legal work 
increase.  
I
C TH − T L M C TH H −−




T L M TH −
G ( ) C rH
) a ) b
U
U I
C TH − T L M C TH H −−




T L M TH −
G ( ) C rH




Figure 1: Returns to Crime 
In figure 1 we can see two simple solutions. In case a) the individual commits crime as long as the 
marginal returns to crime are equal to the market wage, provided that the punishment is very low. 
In case b) the individual does not commit crime as long as  0 S > , because the marginal returns to 
crime of the first hour do not exceed the market wage. A decrease in the market wage would in-
crease  C H   in both cases.  
In this simple framework an increase in active labour market policy could reduce criminal of-
fences because individuals have less time for criminal activities, it helps to improve legal income 
opportunities (thus increase risk of crime), and helps to realise that crime is bad. The hours for 
committing crime could be reduced to zero, at best. On the other hand it probably increases crimi-
nal offences, due to low income opportunities and a decrease in risk of crime (no severe punish-
ment).  
If the individual becomes unemployed it receives benefit replacement rate ( ) B . In case a) of the 
following figure 2 the individual receives  B  and commits crime. As long as it receives the re-
placement rate it reaches the utility  2 U   ( ) X . It can reach the same utility level, if the individual   4
pass on the replacement rate and chooses legal work as well as commits crime () Y ; and if the 
individual decides to work legally only, it reaches  1 U   ( ) Z . If the individual will be apprehended 
the punishment could also result in lower legal income, e.g. due to a criminal conviction, in con-
trast to a constant replacement rate. Furthermore, an increase in the benefit replacement rate could 
increase the reservation wage, too. In this case there is more time to commit crime and this could 
increase the number of criminal offences likewise. We could argue in a similar manner, if the 
benefit duration increases. Therefore, higher benefit replacement rates and longer benefit dura-
tions could lead to an increase in committing crime.  
I
C TH − TL M C TH H −−









) a ) b
1 U
2 U





C TH − TL M C TH H −−









) a ) b
1 U
2 U





Figure 2: Benefit and Returns to Crime 
On the other hand, higher benefit replacement rates and longer benefit durations could lead to a 
decrease in committing crime, if the individual reaches a higher utility level, as in case 2b). In this 
case the standard of living or life satisfaction and not the utility maximisation drive the decision to 
commit crime. From this it follows, that a decrease in the benefit replacement rate and/or benefit 
duration could lead to an increase in criminal activity.  
If the individuals have different skill levels, they receive different wages from legal work. In Fig-
ure 3a) the high skilled wage  h w  exceeds the marginal returns to crime, whereas the low skilled 
wage  l w  exceeds the marginal returns to crime only after a few hours of committing crime.
5 
Therefore, it may be expected that the decision to commit crime decreases with the skill level and 
labour income respectively.  
If the punishment leads to a reduction of labour income,  S  is higher for the high skilled. This 
reduces the net returns to crime () R  with an increasing skill level ( ) θ , if we take S  into account: 
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 Most studies of criminal income come to the conclusion that the share of legal income is lower for the low skilled. See Freeman (1999) for 
a discussion of that point.    5
  () () ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ,1 CC RH S prH p S θ θ =− −  (5) 
For the individual income it follows: 
  () () , MC I wH R H S G θ =+ +  (6) 
The consequences are diagrammed in figure 3b). The low skilled could increase his utility level 
() l U , if he commits crime.
6 The high skilled does not commit crime if he takes the consequences 
for his labour income into account. From this it follows that an increase in the average years of 
schooling could reduce criminal offences because with an increase in the skill level the criminal 
energy decreases and higher income increases the risks of crime.
7 The opposite effect is possible if 
the high skilled commit a more intelligent kind of crime. 
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Figure 3: Skills and Returns to Crime 
In the econometric part of this paper we don’t estimate this model, since we are not dealing with 
micro data. As it is the aim of this paper to analyse a set of European countries, we can only fall 
back on the macro level. However, the theoretical implications discussed above will help to un-
derstand the estimates discussed in section 5.  
3. The Data 
The countries considered are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom. The 
criminal offences considered are intentional homicide, assault, rape, robbery, theft, and drug of-
fences. All data are taken from the European sourcebook of crime and criminal justice statistics 
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 Gould et al. (1998) find a strong relation between crime and the legal wage paid.  
7
 Freeman (1995) finds a significant negative impact of schooling on the share of income from illegal sources.    6
(1999, 2003) and correspond to offences known to the police. The data are provided in offences 
per 100,000 of population.
8  
The explanatory variables are benefit duration, benefit replacement rate, active labour market pol-
icy, average years of schooling, real compensation per hour worked, share of foreigners, employ-
ment population ratio, unemployment rate, and the share of long term unemployed. The data for 
benefit duration and replacement rate are taken from Nickell and Nunciata (2002) and Baker et al. 
(2003). Average years of schooling and the real compensation per hour worked are taken from 
Osberg and Sharpe (2003). The data for share of foreigners, employment population ratio, and the 
unemployment rate are taken from the OECD online database. The data for the share of long term 
unemployed are taken from various issues of the employment outlook (OECD) and the data for 
active labour market policy are taken from Baker et al. (2002).  
The additional variables are more or less common determinants of criminal offences and their 
effects based on the following theoretical considerations:
9 
•  Compensation per hour worked: An increase in the legal income increases life satisfaction 
and/or the risk of crime; but if, in the latter case, the returns to crime increase, as well, the op-
posite effect is also possible.
10 
•  Share of foreigners: An increase of the share of foreigners could reduce criminal offences due 
to the risk of losing the residence permit and the tendency to foreigner ghettos (less official of-
fences). It could increase criminal offences if the foreigners have another moral concept or 
greater economic incentive. 
•  Employment population ratio: An increase in the employment population ratio could reduce 
criminal offences if the probability of legal income increases, but increase them, if the returns 
to crime increase due to an increase in the share of employed to unemployed. Another expla-
nation for a positive effect is the lifestyle theory (Cohen and Felson (1979)).  In this case the 
criminal offences are explained by means of opportunities, which are higher for employed 
than for unemployed.  
•  Unemployment rate: An increase in the unemployment rate could increase criminal offences 
because it decreases the living standard and increases frustration, respectively. Criminal of-
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 To keep the estimated parameters of the linear models about the same size, assault, robbery, and drug trafficking are additionally divided by 
100 and theft and drug offences are divided by 1000. In the log-linear model this concerns only the constant.   
9
 Entorf and Spengler (2002) provide an extensive discussion of the above mentioned and other explanatory variables.  
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 See, for example, Freeman (1999) for a more detailed discussion of this point.   7
fences could decrease if the share of unemployed woman (who control criminal men) increase 
and the returns to crime decrease due to a decrease in the share of employed to unemployed.
11  
•  Share of long-term unemployment: The arguments for this variable are the same as fur the 
unemployment rate. Additionally, this variable could increase the over-all effect of the unem-
ployed, if the long-term unemployed have a higher criminal twist.  
To account for demographic aspects the share of long term unemployed, the employment popula-
tion ratio, and the unemployment rate is separated into different age cohorts and sex. The follow-
ing table comprises all variables used and their abbreviations.  
Table 1: Variables and abbreviations 
Variables Abbreviations
benefit duration  bd 
benefit replacement rate  brr 
active labour market policy    alp 
average years of schooling    ays 
compensation per hour worked in 1995 US dollars  chw 
share of foreigners  sof 
employment population ratio  ep 
standardised unemployment rate  u 
share of unemployed 1 year and more  slu 
ep, 15-19 years  ep1519 
ep, 15-19 years, man  ep1519m 
ep, 15-19 years, woman  ep1519w 
ep, 15-24 years  ep1524 
ep, 15-24 years, man  ep1524m 
ep, 15-24 years, woman  ep1524w 
ep, 25-64 years  ep2564 
ep, 25-64 years, man  ep2564m 
ep, 25-64 years, woman  ep2564w 
ep, total, man  eptom 
ep, total, woman    eptow 
u, 15-19, both sex  u1519 
u, 15-19, man  u1519m 
u, 15-19, woman  u1519w 
u, 15-24, both sex  u1524 
u, 15-24, man  u1524m 
u, 15-24, woman  u1524w 
u, 15-64, both sex  u1564 
u, 25-64, both sex  u2564 
u, 25-64, man  u2564m 
u, 25-64, woman  u2564w 
slu, 15-24 years, both sex  slu1524 
slu, 25-54 years, both sex  slu2554 
slu, 25-54 years, man  slu2554m 
slu, 25-54 years, woman  slu2554w 
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 Cantor and Land (1985) argue that there are two effects. If unemployment increases due to economic slowdown, the employ-
ment/population ratio decreases. The newly unemployed now watch their property, implying less scope for burgle. If unemployment is 
negative (positive) related to criminal offences, the watching (unemployment) effect dominates. Weatherburn (2002) points out, that 
these two effects are a potential reason, why the over-all effect may be non-significant.    8
4. The Econometric Model 
The crime statistics only report data for the period 1990 to 2000. Thus, only panel estimates are 
possible. An unbalanced panel is used due to the fact that not all variables are available for the 
whole time period. If C is the offence and X a vector of explanatory variables, the usual panel 
model is:  
  it i t j jit it
j
CX α αα β ε =+++ + ∑  (7) 
The subscript i (j) stand for the different countries (explanatory variables). The parameters αi and 
αt are the fixed and time effects, respectively. Random effects don’t seem to be appropriate in 
case of cross-country macro data, which is confirmed by the application of the Hausman test. Fur-
thermore, time effects dropped out of the equation, since they don’t improve the estimates. All 
estimates are based on unbalanced panels in order to increase the sample size. In consequence of 
the unbalanced panel we cannot use a GLS estimator to control for heteroscedasticity and autocor-
relation. Therefore, White-robust covariances are used to get reliable estimates of the standard 
deviations. To improve the estimates additionally, all variables whose parameters have a p-value 
higher than 0.3 (approximately t-statistic = 1) are dropped out of the equation, due to there insuf-
ficient explanatory power.
12 However, if we control for different demographic aspects, the respec-
tive parameters will always be shown.  
In contrast to micro data, several macro studies find no statistically significant causal relation be-
tween crime and unemployment in either direction for aggregated data.
13 Furthermore, it seems 
implausible that labour market policy and crime have a bivariate causal relation. On this account 
we use OLS instead of an IV estimator.  
For each of the offences we estimate 16 equations. The first one does not contain demographic 
control variables, whereas the following ones control for demographic aspects of the employment 
population ratio, the unemployment rate, and the share of long term unemployed.
14 Additionally, 
each equation is estimated with and without fixed effects, in order to demonstrate that some pa-
rameters change dramatically. Finally, a linear and a log-linear specification will be estimated.
15  
In principle we have two specifications and each equation contains a set of explanatory variables 
() k  equal to or less than the available set of regressors ( ) J : 
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 See Entorf and Spengler (2002) for a similar procedure.  
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 See, for example, Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001) and Entorf and Spengler (2002) for a more detailed discussion.  
14
 Due to the problem of multicollinearity within the three demographic control groups, only the variables with the best fit of each group will 
be considered.  
15
 These two specifications are used most frequently in the literature on the relation of unemployment and crime.    9
 
k
it i j jit it
j
CX α αβ ε =++ + ∑  with  kJ ≤  (8) 
 
k
it j jit it
j
CX α βε =+ + ∑  with  kJ ≤  (9) 
Given that only eleven years of data are available, tests for orders of integration are inappropriate.  
5. Results 
While theoretical models come to the conclusion that higher unemployment leads to an increase in 
criminal offence, the empirical results are contradictory.
16 On reason lies in the heterogeneity of 
crime. While the relationship is clear between unemployment and theft, it is less clear between 
unemployment and assault. Another reason is the variable unemployment herself. If aggregate 
data are used it seems to be important that unemployment is differentiated with respect to age, 
sex, and the spell of unemployment. By the same token we differentiate the employment popula-
tion ratio with respect to age and sex. The effects of the other variables change with respect to the 
sign across the different kinds of crime. On this account we discuss each criminal offence sepa-
rately.  
The results for total intentional homicide are presented in Table 2. With respect to the log-linear 
specification benefit duration has a negative but non-significant effect or no effect if we control 
for fixed effects. Without fixed effects the respective parameter is positive and significant. The 
estimates for benefit replacement rate are similar with respect to the consideration of fixed effects, 
but the significance level is higher for the negative effects and lower for the positive ones. The 
results for benefit duration in the linear specification are similar with respect to the sign, but in 
this case the consideration of unobserved heterogeneity leads to significant negative effects. The 
benefit replacement rate does not seem to have a significant effect in the linear specification, if we 
consider unobserved heterogeneity. Due to the fact that fixed effects improve the equations no-
ticeably, we have to conclude that a wilful neglect of unobserved heterogeneity results in a wrong 
interpretation of the impact of labour market institutions on intentional homicide.  
[TABLE 2 ABOUR HERE] 
Active labour market policy doesn’t have a significant effect in the log-linear specification, but it 
does in the linear model. In the latter case we get significant negative effects, if we neglect fixed 
effects. If we consider unobserved heterogeneity, active labour market policy has no significant 
effect on intentional homicide. The results for average years of schooling are comparatively ro-
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 See Chiricos (1987) for a review of 63 unemployment-crime studies and Entorf and Spenger (2002) for a discussion of more recent studies.    10
bust with respect to the neglect and consideration of fixed effects. All estimated parameters are 
significantly negative and agree with the theoretical considerations in section 2.  
Regarding compensation per hour worked all estimated parameters without controlling for fixed 
effects are significantly negative. Interestingly, we receive no significant effect if we consider 
unobserved heterogeneity. With respect to the share of foreigners each specification results in a 
positive effect. Merely, the log-linear fixed effects specifications have a lower level of signifi-
cance.  
The employment population ratio has no significant effect in most of the pool estimates. If we 
control for unobserved heterogeneity the estimated parameters are mostly positive. The relevance 
of fixed effects will be abundantly clear if we focus on the employment population ratio of men 
between 25 and 64 years. In this case fixed effects change the sign and the significance of the 
parameter.  
With respect to the relation between intentional homicide and unemployment we receive for the 
linear as well as for the log-linear specification two different results. Roughly speaking, if we 
consider unobserved heterogeneity the sign of the respective parameter will change from positive 
to negative in most cases. The cohort between 25 and 64 years illustrates this observation. In the 
log-linear specification the results are more distinct if we consider men only in this age cohort. 
The share of long term unemployed has a positive significant effect if we choose the pool specifi-
cation. With respect to the fixed effects model the effects are positive in the log-linear specifica-
tion, but non-significant in the linear model. If we control for the age cohort 25 to 54 years of 
women, the parameter will be negative especially in the linear specification.  
The results for completed intentional homicide (excluding attempts) are presented in Table 3. The 
effect of benefit duration on completed intentional homicide is positive in the log linear equations. 
In the linear model the parameter will be negative, if we use fixed effects. However, the evidence 
is week. With respect to benefit replacement rate the estimates are negative in the log-linear speci-
fication. Again, in case of the linear model the results change, if we consider unobserved hetero-
geneity. In this specification the effect of the replacement rate is omitted due to low significance.  
[TABLE 3 ABOUR HERE] 
The results of the pooled estimates show a significant negative effect of an increase in the active 
labour market policy on completed intentional homicide. However, the results are not significant 
if we apply panel estimates. Average years of schooling have the expected negative effect and the 
results are comparatively robust across the different specifications.  
An increase in the compensation per hour worked reduces completed intentional homicide in all 
pooled specifications. However, the effect turns out to be non-significant if we control for unob-  11
served heterogeneity. The share of foreigners significantly increases intentional homicide if we 
use the homogenous specification, whereas it does not if we use the log-linear fixed effects model.  
With respect to the employment population ratio we obtain different results. All fixed effects es-
timates yield significant positive effects on completed intentional homicide. However, the results 
are significant negative in the pooled log-linear specification and non-significant in the pooled 
linear specification. This will be confirmed if we control for the age cohort 25 to 64 years of men.  
Unemployment increases intentional homicide significantly if we apply fixed effects. The neglect 
of unobserved heterogeneity leads to different results. In the log-linear model the results are 
mixed whereas in the linear one they are not significant. If we control for the age cohort 15 to 64 
years and 25 to 64 years of men the estimated effect is positive for any kind of specification. The 
share of long term unemployed has a positive effect on completed intentional homicide, if the 
pooled model will be applied. In the other case the estimated parameters are not significant. These 
results don’t change if we control for the age cohort 25 to 54 years and 25 to 54 years of men.  
Table 4 presents the estimates for assault. An increase in benefit duration has a positive influence 
on assault if the pool specification is applied. For the linear fixed effects model this is also true. 
With respect to benefit replacement rate most of the pooled estimates are significant negative. 
Again, for the linear fixed effects model this is true. 
[TABLE 4 ABOUR HERE] 
The results for active labour market policy are not clear cut. With respect to the model with a 
common constant for all countries the estimated effects are positive in the log-linear specification, 
but mixed and mostly non-significant in the linear one. If we consider unobserved heterogeneity, 
the evidence in the log-linear model is weakly positive, but weakly negative in the linear model. 
The results for average years of schooling are unambiguous for the linear model. All pooled (fixed 
effects) specifications give rise to significant negative (positive) effects. The results of the log-
linear model are not as clear cut.   
The compensation per hour worked does not have a significant effect, if unobserved heterogeneity 
is considered. Otherwise the estimated parameters are significant negative. The picture for the 
share of foreigners is nearly the same, but in this case the pooled estimates yield significant posi-
tive effects.  
With respect to the employment population ratio the log-linear model does not seem to be appro-
priate. Whereas the linear pooled model yields significant positive effects, the fixed effects speci-
fication lead to weak negative results. The results change if we estimate the effects with the age 
cohort 25 to 64 years for men only. In this case any specification yields significant negative ef-
fects.    12
The results for the fixed effects estimates for the relation between unemployment and assault are 
significant negative, as expected. The panel specification leads to mixed results. Interestingly, the 
estimated effects are negative if we control for men with the age cohort 25 to 64 years in the em-
ployment population ratio, but positive if we control for men with the age cohort 25 to 54 years in 
the share of long term unemployed. Finally, the estimates for the share of long term unemployed 
are ambiguous. The results are positive if we choose the log-linear specification; however, the 
sign of the respective parameter depends on the consideration of heterogeneity for the linear 
model. Theses results don’t change much if we control for the age cohort 25 to 54 years of men. 
The results for robbery are presented in Table 5. One important finding is that all linear specifica-
tions yield poor estimates. Benefit duration seems to have a positive effect on robbery, but the 
estimates do not yield significant results with respect to benefit duration if we apply the log-linear 
fixed effects specification. The benefit replacement rate has a statistically weak negative effect if 
we use the fixed effects model.  
[TABLE 5 ABOUR HERE] 
The effect of active labour market policy is negative, but weak in the statistical sense. The log-
linear pool specification of average years of schooling yield to significant negative effects. How-
ever, if unobserved heterogeneity is considered, the respective parameter is significant positive. 
The effect of compensation per hour worked on robbery is significant negative in the pooled 
specifications. The fixed effects estimates give rise to non-significant parameters with a slight 
tendency to a positive effect. In the log-linear pooled specification an increase in the share of for-
eigners increases robbery. However, in the fixed effects specifications the respective parameter is 
negative but non-significant.  
In the log-linear specification pooled estimates yield positive effects of the employment popula-
tion ratio on robbery and to negative but non-significant effects (with one exception), if unob-
served heterogeneity is considered. If we control for the age cohort 25 to 64 years of men, an in-
crease in the employment population ratio reduces robbery.  
Roughly speaking, an increase in the unemployment rate decreases robbery. This finding is inde-
pendent of the specification. Interestingly, the estimated effect is positive, if we control for young 
women. The share of long term unemployed has a weak positive effect on robbery, if the pooled 
specification is chosen. However, if we control for unobserved heterogeneity, no statistically sig-
nificant effect is estimated. The significance of the effect increases in the pooled model, if we 
control for the age cohort 25 to 54 years of men.  
Table 6 presents the estimates for rape. We have to be very careful with respect to the interpreta-
tion of these estimates, particularly with regard to the unknown dark figure. The linear specifica-  13
tions for rape have no explanatory power. In the following we discuss only the results of the log-
linear models. An increase of the benefit duration has a positive effect in the pooled specification, 
but no significant effect in the fixed effects models, if we control for specific cohorts of men. For 
the benefit replacement rate the results of the pooled models are positive likewise, but in most of 
the fixed effects specifications non-significant.  
[TABLE 6 ABOUR HERE] 
The pooled estimates for active labour market police yield positive effects, whereas the control for 
unobserved heterogeneity leads to a significant negative effect in only one case. Unlike the pooled 
estimates the fixed effects models yield the results that rape increases with the average skill level, 
as measured by average years of schooling.  
An increase in the compensation per hour worked decreases significantly (non-significantly) rape, 
if we use the pooled (fixed effects) specification. The evidence that an increase in the share of 
foreigners increases rape is not reliable, due to the fact that unobserved heterogeneity is not con-
sidered.  
The effect of the employment population ratio is positive in general but negative if we control for 
the age cohort 25 to 64 years of men in the pooled specification. However, it is not significant, if 
we control for unobserved heterogeneity. Unemployment seems to have a positive effect if we 
apply the pooled specification, but the effect is not significant in the fixed effects specification. 
The results for the share of long term unemployed are nearly the same as for the unemployment 
rate. The only difference is that the considered age cohort of men has no significant effect on rape.  
The results for total theft are presented in Table 7. Benefit duration has a positive effect on theft in 
the pooled specification and a negative effect in the fixed effects models. Benefit replacement rate 
has a positive but mostly non-significant effect if we apply the log-linear pooled specification and 
no clear effect if we control for unobserved heterogeneity. With respect to the linear specification 
the fixed effects model yield to positive effects and the pooled specification lead to negative ef-
fects more often than not.  
[TABLE 7 ABOUR HERE] 
The effect of active labour market policy on theft is positive in the pooled specification but non 
significant, if we apply the fixed effects model. Theft decreases, if average years of schooling 
increases. This finding is robust across the different specifications.  
The compensation per hour worked has a negative effect on theft in the pooled specification. If we 
control for unobserved heterogeneity this effect is statistically weak in the log-linear model and   14
non-significant in the linear specification. The share of foreigners has a positive but mostly non-
significant effect in the pooled estimates and no effect in the fixed effects model.  
Theft increases, if the employment population ratio increases. This effect is robust across the dif-
ferent specifications and increases, if we control for the age cohort 25 to 64 years of men. With 
respect to the unemployment rate most of the fixed effects estimates yield significant positive 
effects on theft. The significance decreases, if we apply the pooled specification. The results do 
not change, if we control for the age cohort 25 to 64 of men and both gender respectively. An 
increase in the share of long term unemployed increase theft only in the pooled specification. If 
we consider unobserved heterogeneity, we find no significant effect. If we control for the age co-
hort 25 to 54, the significance of the fixed effects estimates increases, but is still to low for a reli-
able conclusion.  
Table 8 presents the estimates for burglary theft. The effect of benefit duration seems to be posi-
tive but not significant, if we apply the fixed effects model. With respect to benefit replacement 
rate the pooled estimates yield to positive effects. However, the fixed effects model leads to nega-
tive but non-significant results.  
[TABLE 8 ABOUR HERE] 
Active labour market policy reduces burglary theft if we apply the pooled specification. The sig-
nificance of this effect is reduced markedly, if we control for unobserved heterogeneity. The re-
sults for average years of schooling are akin to active labour market policy. In contrast to the latter 
the fixed effects estimates for average years of schooling yield to positive as well as negative ef-
fects.  
An increase in the compensation per hour worked reduces burglary theft in the pooled specifica-
tion, but leads to statistically weak and unclear results if we apply the fixed effects model. The 
share of foreigners has only a positive effect on burglary theft if we use the pooled model. In the 
other case the effect is not significant, but appears to be negative.  
The employment population ratio has an increasing effect on burglary theft in the pooled specifi-
cation, but no significant effect in the fixed effects model. If we control for the age cohort 25 to 
64 of men the estimates are negative. However, the significance is higher in the log-linear and 
fixed effects specifications.  
The effect of the unemployment rate is predominantly negative in the pooled specification. If we 
consider unobserved heterogeneity the results are not clear cut. If we control for the age cohort 25 
to 64 of men the estimated effect is negative (positive) in the pooled (fixed effects) specification. 
If we consider the younger age cohort 15 to 24 years of men, the significance reduces somewhat. 
The results for the share of long term unemployed are consistently significant. However, the fixed   15
effects model yields negative effects, whereas the pooled specification leads to positive effects. If 
we control for the age cohort 25 to 54 of mean, the estimated parameters increase in most of the 
cases.  
The results for total drug offences are presented in Table 9. The effect of benefit duration on total 
drug offences is not clear cut if we apply the pooled specification. However, the effect is positive 
if we control for unobserved heterogeneity. If the benefit replacement rate increases the total drug 
offences decreases. This effect has a lower significance in the fixed effects model.  
[TABLE 9 ABOUR HERE] 
The effect of active labour market policy is non-significant in most of the cases, but the over-all 
effect appears to be negative. In the pooled specification the effect of average years of schooling 
is mixed, whereas the fixed effects specification yields significant positive effects.  
With respect to the compensation per hour worked the effect on total drug offences is negative in 
most of the cases if we apply a pooled specification. However, there seems to be no statistically 
significant effect if we consider unobserved heterogeneity. If the share of foreigners increases, the 
total drug offences decrease, if we apply the fixed effects model. In the alternative specification 
the effect is not clear cut.  
The effect of the employment population ratio is positive in the pooled specification and non-
significant in the fixed effects variant. However, if we control for young man and women the es-
timated effects are negative in both specifications. The same is true, if we control for the age co-
hort 25 to 64 of men.  
With respect to the unemployment rate the results are mixed in both specifications. If we control 
for the age cohort 15 to 25 the estimated effect is positive and significant. Furthermore, the sig-
nificance decreases if we control for man only. The estimates for the share of long term unem-
ployed are not reliable. The linear specification seems to yield positive (negative) effects, if we 
apply the pooled (fixed effects) specification.  
Table 10 presents the estimates for drug trafficking. Benefit duration decreases drug trafficking, if 
the pooled specification is applied, but increases this criminal offence, if we control for unob-
served heterogeneity. Benefit replacement rate has the same effect as benefit duration if we use 
the model with a common constant. However, the respective parameter of the fixed effects esti-
mates is in most of the cases not significant with a tendency to a negative effect.  
[TABLE 10 ABOUR HERE] 
Active labour market policy also decrease drug trafficking if we apply the pooled specification. 
With respect to the fixed effects estimates we find positive effects in the log-linear model and no   16
clear cut results in the linear specification. The results for average years of schooling are similar 
to that of active labour market policy. Again, in the linear fixed effects specification the estimated 
parameters are negative but not significant.  
In the pooled as well as in the linear fixed effects specification the compensation per hour worked 
increases drug trafficking. The share of foreigners has a positive effect on drug trafficking if we 
apply the homogenous specification. However, the fixed effects estimates yield to non-significant 
results over-all.  
The employment population ratio increases the considered criminal offence in the estimates with a 
pooled specification. The results are ambiguous, if we consider unobserved heterogeneity. If we 
control for the age cohort 15 to 24 years the estimated effect is negative (positive), if we apply the 
pooled (fixed effects) specification.  
The unemployment rate has a negative effect on drug trafficking especially in the linear specifica-
tion. However, if we control for the age cohort 15 to 24 of men, the estimated effect is positive 
and significant (non-significant) in the pooled (fixed effects) specification. The share of long term 
unemployed does not have a significant effect on drug trafficking over-all.  
 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
The results of the previous section highlight that the consideration of unobserved heterogeneity is 
required to get reliable estimates. In most of the cases the sign of the estimated parameters 
changes in comparison to the simple pooled specification. With respect to the sign the linear and 
the log-linear model lead to different effects in some cases.
17 The control for different age cohorts 
and gender helps to understand some estimates that appear to be surprising at the first glance. The 
finding that the gender variation in crime is greater than the age variation corresponds with the 
conclusions of Freeman (1999). The cross-crime variation of the effects of most of the explana-
tory variables is in line with many other studies.  
The main conclusions for the control variables based on fixed effects estimates are the following: 
The effect of the unemployment rate is positive for homicide and theft. In case of assault, robbery, 
and drug offences the effect is negative.
18 In this case the increased share of unemployed woman 
helps to prevent potential criminal men from committing offences. Additionally, women rarely 
commit these types of crime. In contrast to Levitt (1997, 1998) we cannot subdivide into positive 
effects on property crimes and a negative relation between unemployment and violent crimes.
19 
                                                   
17
 Carmichael and Ward (2001) have made the same experience with certain criminal offences when they change the functional form.  
18
 Other studies also find a negative link between unemployment and certain types of violent crime. See, for example, Raphael and Winter-
Ebmer (2001) for a discussion of this finding.  
19
 However, Levitt uses solely the two aggregates violent and property crimes.    17
The effects of the employment population ratio largely agree with the results for the unemploy-
ment rate, particularly with regard to the ratio of men. This is an indication against the lifestyle 
theory, because the sign of the estimated parameter is the same in most of the criminal offences 
for the employment population ratio and the unemployment rate. If we control for gender in the 
employment population ratio the effect of men on crime is mostly negative and the effect of 
women positive. This corresponds to the theory of Kapuscinski et al. (1998) whereby female em-
ployment reduces levels of guardianship.  
The effects of compensation per hour worked are statistically non-significant in most of the cases, 
if we apply the fixed effects model.
20 The relation between the share of foreigners and the different 
types of criminal offences is significant only for homicide and drug offences.
21 Surprisingly, the 
estimated effect is negative in the latter case. The share of long term unemployed has significant 
effects on homicide, assault, theft, and in part on drug offences. In this case the effect is negative 
for property crimes and positive (if significant) for violent crimes.  
The main results for the labour market policy variables are the following, if we take fixed effects 
results only into account: For both total and completed intentional homicide we can sum up that 
an increase in benefit duration and benefit replacement rate decrease the offences in most of the 
cases. Active labour market policy does not seem to have an effect, whereas an increase in the 
average skill level reduces intentional homicide.  
With respect to assault and robbery benefit duration seems to have a positive effect whereas the 
benefit replacement rate seems to have a negative effect. One interpretation of these findings is 
that the spell of unemployment increases the likelihood of these criminal offences. If the search 
intensity for a new job decreases due to an increase of the benefit duration, the attractiveness of 
these criminal offences increases. If, on the other side, the benefit replacement rate increases, the 
need for illegal activities decreases.  
If active labour market policy has an effect on assault and robbery, it appears to be negative. This 
effect is to be expected because it increases the (economic) perspectives of the (former) unem-
ployed. Regarding average years of schooling the estimated effect is positive.  
With respect to rape we have to interpret the results very careful. For benefit duration, benefit 
replacement rate, and active labour market policy the results are hardly significant. As well as for 
assault and robbery the effect of average years of schooling is positive. 
                                                   
20
 The effects of compensation per hour worked on property crime are negative but non-significant in case of theft and drug offences. Levitt 
(1996) also find a negative but non-significant relation between income and property crime, whereas Field (1999), Pyle and Deadman 
(1994) and Deadman and Pyle (1997) find a negative significant relationship.  
21
 Entorf and Spengler (2000) point out that there are several reasons why foreigners are more often suspected than natives. This could lead 
to a positive bias in the estimates for homicide.    18
The effect of benefit duration in the fixed effects models is significantly negative for total theft, 
but not significant for burglary theft. In the same specification the effect of benefit replacement 
rate is negative but not significant for burglary theft and positive but seldom significant for total 
theft. Active labour market policy does not have a significant effect on total and burglary theft. 
However, it seems to be negative in the latter case. The over-all effect of average years of school-
ing on total and burglary theft is negative.  
Benefit duration has a positive effect on total drug offences and drug trafficking whereas the ef-
fect of benefit replacement rate appears to be negative, if we apply the fixed effects model. The 
interpretation is the same as for assault and robbery. An increase of the spell of unemployment 
increases the liability to criminal offences, whereas a higher benefit replacement rate reduces this 
disposition. Active labour market policy has a positive effect in the log-linear specification and a 
statistically weak negative effect in the linear specification, if unobserved heterogeneity is consid-
ered. The over-all effect of average years of schooling on total drug offences and drug trafficking 
is positive. However, with respect to the latter the effect is negative but non-significant in the lin-
ear case.  
The results cannot be subdivided into unambiguous effects on property crimes and violent crimes, 
respectively. Both benefit duration and average years of schooling have positive as well as nega-
tive effects on property and violent crimes. However, they have in common positive effects on 
assault, robbery, and drug offences as well as negative effects on intentional homicide and theft. 
For the former group the returns to crime seem to be higher than the punishment, and for the latter 
group the opposite may be the case. With respect to the sign of the estimated parameters it is con-
spicuous that the effects of the unemployment rate and the employment population ratio are mir-
ror-inverted to that of benefit duration and average years of schooling. Firstly, this underlines the 
existence of opposite indirect effects of benefit duration and unemployment. Secondly, this is an 
indication of moral decline with increasing age, because average years of schooling is an indicator 
of the skill level of the young whereas the employment population ratio is an indicator of an aver-
age of 15 to 64 years. Furthermore, this effect is more distinct, if we control for men in the em-
ployment population ratio.  
Compendious, active labour market policy does not have a significant effect. The other institu-
tions do have significant effects and especially the benefit replacement rate has the expected nega-
tive effect on criminal offences in most cases. The combination of a short benefit duration and a 
high replacement rate, like in the Nordic countries, seems to be a “crime reducing” combination. 
The results for average years of schooling are mixed, hence, we have to research more closely the 
relationship between education and criminal offences. With respect to robbery, for example, it   19
may be that the high skilled have other objectives. Perhaps they favour the crown jewels instead 
of the coin collection of the neighbour.   20
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Appendix A 
The following tables contain the estimates for each considered offence. All estimates based on 
unbalanced panels. Fixed effects are identified with a 9 in the tables. Time effects are not consid-
ered in the estimates because they don’t improve the results. The estimation method is unweighted 
GLS. The t-statistics in parenthesis based on White-robust covariances. To get more reliable esti-
mates all parameters with a p-value higher than 0.3 (approximately t-statistic = 1) are dropped out 
of the equation.    24
Table 2: Intentional Homicide: Total (IHT) 
  LOG(IHT)  IHT 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
bd  0.898  0.846  -0.327  0.682  0.475  -0.364  9.743  -10.057 10.748 -15.026 11.376  -14.300 4.083 -10.406 
  (4.065)  (4.447)  (-1.245)  (3.546)  (2.231) (-1.556)  (3.604) (-2.445) (4.646) (-2.511) (3.644) (-2.239) (1.480) (-2.124) 
brr  1.214 -0.809 1.667 -0.799 0.839 -0.787 1.209  -2.168     7.652  5.125  9.880  17.116  -16.035 
  (1.811) (-1.319) (3.103) (-1.201) (1.397) (-1.552) (2.786) (-5.347)      (1.201)  (0.983)  (1.485)  (3.528)  (-1.077) 
alp     -0.115           -2.112  -3.104  1.821  -1.818  -7.603  
     (-1.326)        (-2.344)    (-4.072) (1.253) (-2.784)    (-5.182)   
ays  -0.275 -0.314 -0.437 -0.334 -0.221 -0.279 -0.305 -0.298  -3.653 -8.108 -4.274 -7.491 -3.060 -9.956 -5.747 -6.019 
  (-3.702) (-4.507) (-5.927) (-3.659) (-3.057) (-4.283) (-3.669) (-4.223)  (-4.261) (-5.899) (-6.008) (-3.680) (-3.005) (-4.062) (-5.100) (-3.363) 
log(chw) -8.276    -8.486 0.830 -7.702    -7.834   -85.588    -91.969  19.282 -97.834 16.604 -92.393   
  (-6.203)    (-7.797) (1.100) (-6.192)    (-10.167)   (-5.659)  (-5.137)  (1.769)  (-4.856) (1.146) (-6.729)   
sof  0.090 0.054 0.134 0.047 0.067 0.068 0.153 0.089  0.987 2.375 1.186 2.498 1.134 2.146 2.988 1.935 
  (2.791) (1.966) (5.832) (1.387) (3.090) (2.548) (4.156) (1.807)  (2.560) (2.756) (3.507) (2.385) (2.426) (2.872) (5.490) (2.354) 
ep -0.030  0.020      0.021  0.030   0.533         -0.221  0.367  0.310  
  (-1.972)  (1.637)      (2.625)  (1.935)   (4.147)        (-1.390)  (1.936)  (1.895)   
u  -0.074 0.038 -0.172 0.059      -0.052 0.064  -0.689 0.975 -1.053 2.171            1.062 
 (-2.855)  (2.147)  (-3.826)  (2.197)     (-1.868)  (3.575)  (-2.268)  (6.704)  (-1.807)  (5.358)          (2.910) 
slu  0.034 0.004 0.032 0.006 0.039 0.003      0.343  0.354  0.390          
  (2.761) (2.051) (2.764) (1.901) (3.528) (1.154)     (3.724)  (2.708)  (2.798)          
ep2564m     -0.112  0.044          -0.309  1.788      
     (-3.677)  (1.645)          (-0.958)  (4.364)      
u2564m/       -0.041  0.044          -1.357  0.907    
u2564       (-2.272)  (3.128)          (-3.680)  (3.742)    
slu2554w         0.042  -0.004         0.352  -0.212 
                     (5.097)  (-1.051)                    (3.679)  (-2.043) 
2 R   0.633 0.971 0.652 0.971 0.626 0.972 0.676 0.971  0.607 0.891 0.600 0.903 0.621 0.888 0.684 0.890 
Fix. Effects    9    9    9    9     9    9    9    9 
Obs.  81 81 81 81 81 81 69 69  81 81 81 81 81 81 69 69 
Countries  11 11 11 11 11 11 10 10  11 11 11 11 11 11 10 10 
Period  91-99 91-99 91-99 91-99 91-99 91-99 91-99 91-99  91-99 91-99 91-99 91-99 91-99 91-99 91-99 91-99 
Numbers in parenthesis are serial correlation and time-varying variances robust t-statistics.    25
Table 3: Intentional Homicide: Completed (IHC) 
  LOG(IHC)  IHC 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
bd  0.564 0.694 0.527 0.758 0.531 0.771 0.508 0.795  2.103 -1.065 2.120 -1.784 1.948 -1.214 1.491 -1.366 
  (5.606) (3.643) (5.301) (2.865) (4.909) (2.446) (6.228) (2.248)  (6.343) (-1.056) (6.229) (-1.366) (5.808) (-1.120) (4.813) (-0.808) 
brr  -0.317 -1.233    -1.062 -0.362 -0.896 -0.717  -1.443  -2.163  -2.014  -2.383  -2.543  
  (-1.095) (-2.626)    (-2.351) (-1.180) (-2.200) (-2.260) (-3.932)  (-2.731)   (-2.753)  (-3.397)  (-2.264)  
alp -0.451  -0.567  -0.482  -0.416   -1.415 0.306 -1.484    -1.501    -1.579   
  (-5.342)  (-8.180)  (-5.913)  (-5.303)   (-5.498) (1.575) (-6.162)    (-6.553)    (-5.146)   
ays  -0.091 -0.344 -0.188 -0.210 -0.080 -0.345    -0.372  -0.594 -2.096 -0.607 -1.453 -0.599 -1.883 -0.661 -2.220 
  (-1.560) (-4.427) (-2.617) (-2.497) (-1.445)  (-3.887)  (-3.844)  (-3.607)  (-4.835)  (-3.513) (-3.967) (-3.955) (-5.323) (-3.600) (-6.513) 
log(chw)  -4.399  -4.314  -3.821  -3.566   -14.789    -14.667  3.076  -12.941  -13.344  
  (-11.558)  (-10.724)   (-7.704)   (-12.198)   (-6.903)  (-6.930)  (1.474)  (-5.109)  (-6.967)  
sof 0.044  0.066  0.036       0.156  0.555 0.163 0.325 0.124 0.549 0.244 0.487 
  (2.843)  (3.470)  (2.169)       (2.577)  (2.405) (2.532) (1.684) (1.688) (2.472) (3.157) (1.970) 
ep  -0.026  0.033        -0.016  0.036  -0.030  0.053    0.250        0.035  0.202  0.050  0.266 
  (-5.334)  (2.922)        (-2.677)  (4.482)  (-4.744)  (4.167)    (3.774)        (1.110)  (3.478)  (1.516)  (3.233) 
u    0.044  -0.046  0.064        0.020  0.063   0.236  0.430        0.071  0.273 
    (3.108)  (-3.508)  (3.327)        (1.543)  (3.562)   (4.247)  (4.314)        (1.692)  (5.623) 
slu  0.012    0.013 0.005 0.013 0.005          0.047    0.044 0.019 0.051           
  (3.604)    (3.658) (1.217) (3.457) (1.426)         (5.653)    (3.746)  (0.964)  (3.494)         
ep2564m     -0.069  0.063          -0.015  0.480      
     (-4.886)  (2.911)          (-0.573)  (3.988)      
u1564m/       0.023  0.035          0.075  0.207    
u2564m       (2.239)  (3.232)          (2.467)  (3.833)    
slu2554/         0.010  0.003         0.051  -0.007 
 slu2554m                    (2.744)  (0.961)                    (3.390)  (-0.315) 
2 R   0.804 0.927 0.813 0.929 0.806 0.930 0.779 0.929  0.789 0.897 0.787 0.906 0.787 0.897 0.797 0.896 
Fix. Effects    9    9    9    9    9    9    9    9 
Obs.  84  100  84 99 84 99 86 87  84 84 84 84 84 84 73 73 
Countries  11 11 11 11 11 11 10 10  11 11 11 11 11 11 10 10 
Period  91-99 90-99 91-99 90-99 91-99 90-99 90-99 90-99  91-99 91-99 91-99 91-99 91-99 91-99 91-99 91-99 
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Table 4: Assault (AS) 
  LOG(AS)  AS 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
bd  1.356    1.637 0.431 1.349 0.399 0.490 0.972  3.702 8.630 6.547 9.662 3.532  10.034    8.888 
  (15.486)    (8.154)  (1.278) (14.817) (1.436) (2.759) (2.146)  (4.223) (1.999) (6.783) (1.960) (3.513) (2.251)    (1.730) 
brr -1.507  0.525  0.283  -1.479    1.884  -16.168  -10.379 -5.735  -6.950 -17.523 -10.330 -11.319 -11.133 
 (-3.854)    (1.698)  (1.070)  (-3.861)      (2.855)  (-4.333) (-2.046) (-5.651) (-2.045) (-4.139) (-2.384) (-2.854) (-2.464) 
alp  0.706 0.174 0.240    0.683 0.176 -0.125    0.603 -0.750 -1.103 -1.380 0.534 -1.127 -2.152   
  (7.197) (2.312) (1.910)    (7.711) (1.654) (-1.438)    (1.287) (-1.543) (-1.290) (-2.409) (1.076) (-1.386) (-2.521)   
ays   0.294  -0.480  0.224  0.369  -0.245   -1.223 3.378 -2.984 2.129 -0.716 3.352 -2.140 4.265 
   (3.041)  (-6.331)  (1.166)  (1.939)  (-5.375)    (-5.856) (6.557) (-6.794) (5.736) (-3.203) (7.502) (-5.148) (4.239) 
log(chw)  -7.351    -9.571 -1.166 -7.105 -1.122 -7.932 -1.763  -27.685    -42.938  -22.592  -29.459  
 (-7.712)    (-13.750)  (-1.203)  (-6.780) (-1.074)  (-12.842) (-1.772)  (-6.927)   (-9.222)  (-4.018)  (-6.583)  
sof 0.107  0.281  0.106  0.384  0.104  0.288  1.078  0.190  1.289  
  (5.420)   (10.435)   (5.359)   (11.191)  (2.246)  (1.926)   (14.214)   (0.983)  (6.476)  
ep              0.014  0.061    0.333  -0.106        0.505    0.579  -0.227 
              (1.570)  (2.832)    (2.904)  (-3.532)        (2.578)    (5.126)  (-1.681) 
u    -0.033 -0.351 -0.096          0.089 -0.022    -0.200  -1.381  -0.560        0.290  -0.253 
    (-2.441) (-4.393) (-5.441)          (7.222) (-1.521)    (-3.859)  (-2.625)  (-3.373)        (2.398)  (-3.224) 
slu 0.026  0.017  0.009  0.025  0.017         0.154      -0.063 0.194 -0.040         
  (3.224)  (3.183)  (2.330)  (2.898)  (2.651)        (3.835)      (-1.973)  (3.703)  (-1.955)       
ep2564m     -0.313  -0.089          -0.953  -0.637      
     (-5.801)  (-5.154)          (-3.454)  (-3.246)      
u2564m/       0.013  -0.015          0.150  0.033    
u1524m       (0.943)  (-1.060)          (1.968)  (0.925)    
slu2554m         0.033  0.013         0.194  -0.038 
                     (2.724)  (2.100)                    (6.017)  (-1.080) 
2 R   0.583 0.963 0.677 0.964 0.578 0.960 0.749 0.949  0.562 0.905 0.588 0.911 0.566 0.906 0.688 0.903 
Fix. Effects    9    9    9    9    9    9    9    9 
Obs.  88 110 88 104 88 103 76  76  88 104 88 103 88 103 76  90 
Countries  11 11 11 11 11 11 10 10  11 11 11 11 11 11 10 10 
Period  91-99 90-99 91-99 90-99 91-99 90-99 91-99 91-99  91-99 90-99 91-99 90-99 91-99 90-99 91-99 90-99 
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Table 5: Robbery (RO) 
  LOG(RO)  RO 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
bd  0.970    1.235 0.577 0.534 0.553 0.462    3.685 19.250 2.752 19.455 5.084 17.885     
 (7.597)    (4.273)  (1.336)  (1.829)  (1.277) (1.777)    (2.873) (2.266) (3.055) (2.798) (3.969) (2.334)     
brr -1.099  -1.327  -0.721  -2.295  -3.809   -23.653  -23.217  -28.696  -58.755 
  (-1.045)  (-1.802)  (-0.969)  (-1.463)  (-1.636)   (-1.459)  (-1.268)  (-1.957)  (-1.215) 
alp    -0.252 -0.287 -0.362 -0.708 -0.272 -0.526  -0.223  -1.931  -2.535      -3.065  
    (-1.735) (-1.517) (-4.071) (-2.955) (-1.671) (-1.900) (-1.644)  (-1.307)  (-1.589)      (-1.663)  
ays -0.259  0.438  -0.501  -0.397  0.753  -0.430  0.899    11.516   7.667   10.357    13.095 
  (-4.080)  (1.986)  (-2.826)  (-2.374) (6.025) (-2.642) (2.219)    (2.109)  (1.717)  (2.138)  (2.035) 
log(chw) -5.857 4.001 -7.318 3.673 -5.329    -5.887 4.703  -21.460    -19.241   -16.961  -11.109  86.686 
  (-3.535) (1.652) (-6.875) (2.201) (-6.442)  (-6.786)  (1.273)  (-2.433)  (-2.400)  (-2.303)  (-1.609)  (1.186) 
sof  0.081 -0.261 0.185 -0.254 0.268    0.269 -0.424   -4.339  -3.962  -2.917  -9.830 
  (3.266) (-1.015) (4.357) (-1.399) (3.923)  (4.132)  (-1.031)   (-1.139)  (-1.274)  (-1.031)  (-1.171) 
ep  0.031  -0.053        0.096  0.062  0.064  -0.107    -0.935            0.355  -2.535 
  (2.202)  (-1.015)        (2.210)  (2.249)  (4.284)  (-1.141)    (-1.123)            (1.974)  (-1.316) 
u  -0.108 -0.076 -0.297 -0.176          -0.048 -0.079  -0.684 -0.963 -0.972 -1.857          -0.342 -1.386 
  (-2.494) (-2.601) (-3.564) (-7.797)          (-1.295) (-2.359)  (-1.484) (-2.222) (-1.654)  (-4.704)        (-1.036)  (-2.073) 
slu 0.054  0.032  0.056           0.201  0.164  0.284          
  (2.572)  (1.827)  (2.240)           (1.650)  (1.489)  (2.321)          
ep2564m     -0.153  -0.163          -0.282  -1.867      
     (-2.467)  (-4.429)          (-1.674)  (-3.143)      
u1519w/       0.019  0.031          -1.063  -0.017    
u2564w       (2.721)  (1.578)          (-2.532)  (-0.038)    
slu2554m         0.058  -0.012         0.279  -0.218 
                     (3.051)  (-0.912)                    (1.743)  (-1.008) 
2 R   0.349 0.723 0.381 0.731 0.411 0.730 0.492 0.713  0.040 0.059 0.031 0.066 0.064 0.064 0.061 0.043 
Fix. Effects    9    9    9    9    9    9    9    9 
Obs.  87 87 87 87 78 92 75 75  103  87  102  87  103  87 92 75 
Countries  11 11 11 11 10 10 10 10  11 11 11 11 11 11 10 10 
Period  91-99 91-99 91-99 91-99 91-99 90-99 91-99 91-99  90-99 91-99 90-99 91-99 90-99 91-99 90-00 91-99 
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Table 6: Rape (RA) 
  LOG(RA)  RA 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
bd  0.689  -0.597  1.197  0.673  0.240   7.765      7.464     * 
  (8.419) (-2.679) (6.727)    (8.470)    (1.245)    (4.174)      (4.241)     
brr    1.587  0.904     2.909           163.137 * 
     (3.331)  (2.029)     (2.692)           (1.237)   
alp  0.147      0.126    -0.885  0.130  -2.998  -5.063  -4.689   -56.340  * 
  (3.034)      (2.157)    (-3.541)  (0.988)  (-1.652)  (-1.624)  (-1.921)  (-1.278)  
ays   0.459  -0.272  0.381  0.618  -0.435  0.751 -2.703        -4.056    -19.840 * 
   (2.741)  (-3.003)  (1.238)  (4.245)  (-3.300)  (3.504)  (-1.155)      (-1.746)  (-1.293)  
log(chw)  -2.234    -5.863 -2.627 -1.854 -1.618 -5.550 -3.788  -75.589    -67.786  -51.321   -166.997 * 
 (-5.246)    (-5.234)  (-1.265)  (-4.020) (-1.004) (-3.655) (-1.378)  (-1.552)   (-1.897)  (-1.079)  (-2.159)  
sof    0.135      0.385  0.173         11.205  * 
     (4.953)      (6.059)  (1.052)             (1.712)  
ep  0.039          0.040    0.071      -4.537        0.861      * 
  (7.416)          (11.774)    (2.674)      (-0.999)        (1.841)       
u  0.025    -0.211  -0.129        0.077    -2.117  -6.050    -6.779          * 
  (1.338)    (-2.920)  (-1.132)        (2.420)    (-0.992)  (-1.241)    (-1.380)           
slu 0.009      0.009            1.799  1.526  2.090        
  (2.923)      (2.806)            (1.197)  (1.077)  (1.171)        
ep2564m/     -0.143  -0.148          0.260  -5.840      
eptom     (-3.929)  (-1.120)          (0.926)  (-1.212)      
u2564m/       0.047  0.017          -0.109  -1.579    
u1564m       (2.431)  (1.161)          (-0.073)  (-2.037)    
slu2554m         0.010  0.006         -0.946  * 
                     (0.978)  (0.638)                    (-0.846)    
2 R   0.227 0.693 0.285 0.707 0.235 0.707 0.538 0.640  -0.036 0.016 -0.017 0.018 -0.048 0.015 -0.030  * 
Fix. Effects    9    9    9    9    9    9    9    9 
Obs.  104 105  88  104 103 113  76  80  104 105 109 149 103 149  76  80 
Countries  11 11 11 11 11 11 10 10  11 11 11 15 11 15 10 10 
Period  90-99 90-99 91-99 90-99 90-99 90-00 91-99 90-00  90-99 90-99 90-00 90-00 90-99 90-00 91-99 90-00 
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Table 7: Theft: Total (TT) 
  LOG(TT)  TT 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
bd  0.298 -0.358 0.376    0.190 -0.358 0.243 -0.336  2.101 -4.052 2.790 -4.433 1.961 -5.585 1.531 -4.128 
  (2.265) (-2.188) (4.148)    (3.510) (-2.339) (1.978) (-1.862)  (1.721) (-3.473) (3.288) (-4.693) (1.417) (-2.499) (1.408) (-2.740) 
brr    0.177 0.104 -0.698    0.427 0.733    -1.643 5.978 -3.985 4.079 -1.822 9.938 3.343 3.532 
   (1.001)  (0.874)  (-2.212)    (2.449)  (3.973)    (-1.546) (4.379) (-2.636) (1.438) (-1.534) (3.071) (2.432) (1.567) 
alp 0.265  0.324  0.188       1.405    2.405 0.834 1.348    -0.523   
  (6.973)  (9.737)  (4.370)       (7.266)    (7.178) (1.746) (6.177)    (-1.630)   
ays  -0.075 -0.273 -0.039 -0.268 -0.052 -0.232 -0.192 -0.268  -0.995 -3.476    -1.052 -1.015 -3.696 -1.774 -3.644 
  (-2.066) (-3.068) (-1.493) (-2.572) (-2.619) (-2.838) (-3.979) (-2.973)  (-3.013) (-4.142)    (-1.407) (-3.336) (-3.627) (-3.831) (-5.678) 
log(chw)  -2.215 -0.519 -2.325    -1.623 -0.668 -2.631 -0.772  -16.970    -19.349  -15.814  -19.897  
  (-3.036)  (-1.461)  (-4.007)  (-3.613) (-1.807) (-5.298) (-1.875)  (-2.724)   (-4.875)  (-2.082)  (-3.627)  
sof 0.019  0.016      0.121   0.194      0.174  0.384  0.864  
  (1.282)  (2.445)      (6.020)   (1.423)      (1.060)  (1.068)  (3.771)  
ep  0.048  0.040        0.052  0.025  0.043  0.052  0.298 0.322          0.327 0.368 0.286 0.396 
  (6.786)  (5.734)        (7.684)  (4.155) (4.078) (7.457)  (4.487) (5.617)          (3.601) (3.124) (3.717) (8.174) 
u    0.072 0.034 0.121          0.024 0.087    0.548  0.519  1.152        0.206  0.744 
    (4.336) (1.771) (5.786)          (2.232) (5.279)    (5.958)  (2.862)  (5.636)        (3.051)  (4.358) 
slu 0.018  -0.004  0.010  0.017  -0.005          0.120  0.115  0.121          
  (3.251) (-1.193) (1.997)    (3.817) (-1.361)          (2.979)  (3.731)  (2.970)          
ep2564m     0.052  0.084          0.743  0.996      
     (3.349)  (5.765)          (4.249)  (5.415)      
u2564m/       0.019  0.055          0.070  0.645    
u2564       (2.018)  (3.873)          (0.534)  (4.674)    
slu2554m/         0.010  -0.007         0.068  -0.057 
 slu2554                    (2.678)  (-1.582)                    (2.098)  (-1.150) 
2 R   0.510 0.712 0.513 0.742 0.512 0.702 0.576 0.712  0.381 0.606 0.475 0.644 0.374 0.534 0.420 0.602 
Fix. Effects    9    9    9    9    9    9    9    9 
Obs.  87 104 87 103  102  103 75  89  87 104  102  102 87  87  75  89 
Countries  11 11 11 11 11 11 10 10  11 11 11 11 11 11 10 10 
Period  91-99 90-99 91-99 90-99 90-99 90-99 91-00 90-99  91-99 90-99 90-99 90-99 91-99 91-99 91-00 90-99 
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Table 8: Theft: Burglary Total (TBT) 
  LOG(TBT)  TBT 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
bd  1.633  1.890  1.512  1.319   2.829  1.636 3.407 1.626 2.234 1.814 2.200 3.838 
  (7.377)  (9.002)  (7.192)   (11.686)    (7.263)  (1.092) (8.544) (1.251) (5.306) (1.214) (8.166) (1.779) 
brr 2.205  3.024  0.661  1.936  3.349  -1.164  1.308  -0.865  3.024      2.600  -6.037 
  (4.760)  (7.379)  (1.279)  (3.960)  (7.660)  (-1.898)  (1.141)  (-1.739)  (3.604)      (2.197)  (-1.872) 
alp -0.168  -0.296  -0.049  -0.153  -0.680   -0.567 -0.196 -0.807 -0.280 -0.522 -0.383 -1.252   
 (-2.775)    (-7.416)  (-0.961)  (-2.498)   (-5.156)   (-3.605)  (-1.660)  (-4.047)  (-2.134) (-1.951) (-2.136) (-4.344)   
ays  -0.279 -0.085 -0.420 -0.178 -0.260 -0.054 -0.526  0.155  -0.690  -0.941  -0.723  -1.074  1.461 
  (-10.232) (-2.646) (-5.555) (-4.199)  (-10.078) (-1.721)  (-14.047) (2.176)  (-9.144)  (-5.288)  (-5.319)  (-9.999)  (2.097) 
log(chw)  -5.788  -6.897  -5.588  -5.851  -12.238  2.417  -14.780    -9.668 1.957  -11.952   
  (-7.155)  (-9.822)  (-5.869)  (-9.770)   (-8.257) (1.867)  (-11.384)   (-7.938) (1.452) (-8.897)   
sof 0.054  0.117  0.044  0.254  -0.050  0.086  0.212  0.038  0.407  -0.347 
  (2.045)  (3.650)  (1.647)  (6.823)  (-1.080)  (1.797)  (4.959)  (1.130)  (7.271)  (-1.408) 
ep  0.025  0.010        0.040    0.065    0.070          0.122    0.137  -0.137 
  (1.468)  (1.022)        (1.872)    (3.997)    (2.161)          (3.545)    (4.372)  (-1.488) 
u  -0.068  0.033  -0.170  -0.029          0.031  -0.176 0.043 -0.372 -0.038          -0.087   
  (-2.802)  (4.806)  (-2.808)  (-2.995)          (2.673)  (-2.739) (2.814) (-2.516) (-0.951)          (-1.373)   
slu  0.021 -0.009 0.010 -0.014 0.023 -0.011          0.059 -0.028 0.034 -0.031 0.056 -0.031         
  (4.505) (-4.255) (2.528) (-4.531) (4.286)  (-8.044)        (5.199)  (-4.670)  (2.824) (-3.747) (4.414) (-5.030)         
ep2564m     -0.073  -0.063          -0.122  -0.094      
     (-1.848)  (-5.170)          (-1.520)  (-1.909)      
u2564m/       -0.046  0.028          -0.041  0.038    
u1524m       (-2.265)  (5.095)          (-1.857)  (3.637)    
slu2554m         0.024  -0.012         0.065  -0.053 
                     (4.929)  (-6.171)                    (9.934)  (-2.862) 
2 R   0.613 0.962 0.621 0.967 0.602 0.963 0.793 0.972  0.578 0.903 0.577 0.909 0.563 0.906 0.694 0.912 
Fix. Effects    9    9    9    9    9    9    9    9 
Obs.  85 111 85 100 85 110 73  73  85 101 85 120 85 100 73  73 
Countries  11 11 11 11 11 11 10 10  11 11 11 15 11 11 10 10 
Period  91-99 90-00 91-99 90-99 91-99 90-00 91-00 90-99  91-99 90-99 91-99 90-99 91-99 90-99 91-00 90-99 
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Table 9: Drug Offences: Total (DOT) 
  LOG(DOT)  DOT 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
bd  -1.021 4.244 0.464 2.088 -0.748 4.074 -2.040  3.207  1.329  11.783  2.628  8.834  9.705   14.587 
  (-4.270) (2.286) (3.495) (1.625) (-2.702) (2.207) (-6.207) (2.753)  (2.289) (2.463)  (3.780)  (1.990)  (2.418)  (2.158) 
brr  -5.952 -3.722 -3.422    -5.834 -2.323 -4.194 -9.136  -7.591 -14.434 -2.375  -5.564 -10.362 -11.104  -7.630  -21.382 
  (-4.957)  (-1.790)  (-6.560)  (-4.265)  (-1.324) (-7.407) (-1.906)  (-3.127) (-1.984) (-1.895) (-1.562) (-3.201) (-2.803) (-2.868) (-1.870) 
alp   0.380  -0.454  0.359    -1.217  0.387  -0.767    -1.519 -1.913 -0.683 -1.623 -1.164   
   (1.195)  (-1.333)  (1.233)    (-2.405)  (1.525)  (-1.901)  (-2.391)  (-2.513) (-1.753) (-1.421) (-2.269)   
ays 0.145  2.630  1.781  0.426  2.343  -0.237  2.817  -0.442 4.519 -1.211 1.926    3.800 -0.315 7.207 
  (2.159)  (4.238)  (5.337)  (6.938)  (4.519) (-2.098) (4.694)  (-1.842)  (12.327)  (-2.949) (3.559)    (9.157) (-1.434) (3.211) 
log(chw) 2.526  -6.693  -5.966    1.711  -4.745     -3.586   -16.060       -2.416  
 (7.685)  (-1.761)  (-2.322)    (5.060)  (-1.165)     (-1.383)  (-3.253)      (-1.178)  
sof    -0.614 0.161 -0.956    -0.725 0.307 -1.307   -0.689  0.354  -0.161    -1.247 
    (-2.806) (12.362) (-4.058)    (-5.326) (8.902) (-6.839)    (-2.560) (4.426)  (-2.929)    (-1.862) 
ep  0.147  0.080        0.135    0.200    0.156  -0.235        0.389    0.227  -0.631 
  (10.214)  (1.507)        (7.989)    (7.819)    (2.794)  (-2.367)        (2.877)    (3.380)  (-1.666) 
u  0.175  0.088  -0.178  -0.162        0.229  0.109    -0.430  -0.764  -0.937          -0.529 
  (7.969)  (2.147)  (-1.489)  (-2.739)        (4.576)  (1.682)    (-6.417)  (-2.787)  (-7.300)          (-6.061) 
slu      -0.022              0.027      -0.098  0.089  -0.073       
      (-2.236)              (1.094)      (-1.886)  (2.563)  (-2.365)       
ep1524/     -0.054  -0.104          -0.395  -0.984      
ep2564m     (-2.140)  (-3.334)          (-3.135)  (-6.609)      
u1524/       0.075  0.018          0.109  0.040    
u1524m       (9.462)  (1.880)          (2.055)  (0.679)    
slu2554m         0.003  -0.011         0.055  -0.087 
                     (0.352)  (-0.446)                    (2.214)  (-0.870) 
2 R   0.386 0.726 0.403 0.744 0.388 0.729 0.511 0.736  0.290 0.545 0.349 0.548 0.346 0.498 0.331 0.557 
Fix. Effects    9    9    9    9    9    9    9    9 
Obs.  104 87  87  87 103 87  75  75  103 87  87 102  101  102 88  75 
Countries  11 11 11 11 11 11 10 10  11 11 11 11 14 11 10 10 
Period  90-99 91-99 91-99 91-99 90-99 91-99 91-99 91-99  90-99 91-99 91-99 90-99 91-99 90-99 90-00 91-99 
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Table 10: Drug Offences: Drug Trafficking (DODT) 
  LOG(DODT)  DODT 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
bd  -4.438 1.862 -2.491 2.598 -3.807 2.770 -4.534 2.978  -2.408 3.607 -1.478 6.508 -2.020 2.849 -2.803 3.000 
  (-8.596) (2.253) (-5.631) (2.346) (-6.849) (2.275) (-6.400) (2.273)  (-7.506) (1.638) (-2.895) (1.603) (-4.777) (1.917)  (-10.381) (3.861) 
brr -5.407  -2.754  -2.369  -4.078  -5.330  5.882  -4.523  -3.289  -14.447  -3.683  -6.233  
 (-4.591)    (-2.796)  (-2.134)  (-3.455)  (-4.005)  (1.717)  (-5.275)  (-4.410) (-1.382) (-3.813)    (-8.727)   
alp  -0.832 0.772 -1.009 0.814 -1.030    -0.717 1.234  -0.553 -1.260 -0.617    -0.678 -1.234    0.692 
  (-4.051) (4.154) (-4.684) (3.211) (-8.019)  (-2.604)  (2.656)  (-3.388)  (-1.175)  (-3.719)  (-5.125)  (-0.980)  (2.123) 
ays  -0.899 0.527 -0.772 0.717 -0.710 -0.797 -1.075 0.688  -0.249 -3.686 -0.169    -0.124 -3.886 -0.358   
  (-8.356) (2.007) (-6.406) (4.877) (-8.829) (-1.226) (-7.410) (1.560)  (-3.052) (-1.477)  (-1.652)  (-1.825)  (-1.281)  (-3.385)  
log(chw)  8.645      8.126  3.137  6.779   8.420 17.348 3.782  8.645  8.207 19.515 7.535  2.789 
  (5.299)      (4.694)  (1.037)  (5.190)   (7.589)  (1.761) (2.703) (2.547) (6.980) (1.443) (3.368) (3.089) 
sof  -0.212 -0.151 -0.033 -0.198 -0.192      -0.469  -0.230  -0.134  -0.223  -0.257  
  (-5.412) (-1.150) (-1.861) (-1.786)  (-5.454)    (-4.116)  (-8.451)  (-4.762)  (-8.950)  (-2.537)  
ep  0.120  0.039        0.130  0.107  0.212  -0.128  0.083  0.144        0.098  0.175  0.108  -0.097 
  (4.621)  (1.089)        (5.730)  (2.674) (4.674) (-2.147)  (1.999) (1.230)         (2.645)  (1.516)  (3.064)  (-2.092) 
u      -0.234          -0.115  -0.135    -0.183  -0.153          -0.090  -0.198 
      (-2.344)          (-1.707)  (-2.149)    (-2.543)  (-2.747)          (-1.703)  (-3.478) 
slu   -0.013  -0.027               -0.029  -0.046  0.078  -0.026          
   (-1.028)  (-1.848)               (-1.577)  (-4.920)  (1.112)  (-1.431)          
ep1524     -0.054  0.041          -0.026  0.302      
     (-4.818)  (8.040)          (-2.087)  (1.851)      
u1524m       0.062  0.009          0.043  -0.060    
       (1.985)  (0.327)          (2.220)  (-1.159)    
slu1524/         0.052  0.000         0.003  0.012 
 slu2554m                    (3.788)  (-0.024)                    (0.249)  (0.724) 
2 R   0.715 0.965 0.731 0.965 0.729 0.927 0.753 0.967  0.655 0.578 0.653 0.599 0.665 0.573 0.694 0.872 
Fix. Effects    9    9    9    9    9    9    9    9 
Obs.  58 58 58 58 58 70 54 43  58 71 58 70 58 70 43 54 
Countries  9 9 9 9 9 9 8 8  9 9 9 9 9 9 8 8 
Period  91-99 91-99 91-99 91-99 91-99 90-99 90-99 90-99  91-99 90-99 91-99 90-99 91-99 90-99 91-99 90-99 
Numbers in parenthesis are serial correlation and time-varying variances robust t-statistics. 